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Introduction. 
  Flight is the most enduring dream of man. No culture or civilization is without its myth of man's 
breaking his terrestrial bonds and flying freely where he would. The consequences of these efforts are 
more often than not depicted as tragic, entailing short-lived glory and ultimate failure, the price paid 
for attempting to defy man's essential nature as a creature bound to the earth. 
  The persuit of man's irrepressible desire for sustained and controlled flight has entailed incredible 
individual ingenuity and sacrifice, and at the same time has drawn on the cumulative contributions of 
countless designers and practitioners. Thus the fruit of long-term and collective effort, it is only in our 
own century that this dream has become reality, and this realization has not been without its material 
and psychic costs. Because powered flight represents a qualitative shift in man's ability to act within 
his physical environment, it is understandable that this new field of endeavor has attracted the most 
impressive talents and resources. However, the achievement has been highly ambiguous in its practical 
effects, as the power conferred by flight has been exercised for both good and ill. This was inevitable, 
for such a multiplication of man's talents must necessarily magnify them all. 
  When considered in all of its dimensions, including especially its economic and technological 
aspects, it is clear that no human pursuit has done more to transform relations among peoples, nations 
and states, or between man and his environment, than has the development of aeronautical capabilities. 
The very nature of flight has made it the object of intense and sustained attention, not only from 
individuals but also of powerful organized interests, especially national governments. This attention 
has, within the space of approximately 80 years, transformed aeronautics into an activity of 
unparalleled economic, political and social salience. Understanding this history helps to explain why 
today aeronautics occupies such a central position in national policies both foreign and domestic, in 
industrialized and developing states alike. 
  This paper examines current conditions in the west European airline sector against the general 
background sketched above of the character and development of the aeronautics industry. It assumes 
that the operation of aircraft for commercial purposes does not differ in its essentials from the rest of 
the sector of which it is an integral part. More specifically, the paper argues that during its entire 
history commercial aviation has been characterized by significant and sustained involvement of 
national governments in shaping, indeed determining, its structure and dynamics. 
  Therefore, the airline business differs from other commercial activities in that all important 
aspects of its current configuration and operation reflect the intense and long-term influence of states. 
This has been especially true in the European context; the region was the fount of the very idea and 
practice of the state, and we should therefore anticipate that past patterns would remain especially 
enduring there. 
  The paper thus examines patterns of state involvement in the creation, ownership and operation of 
airlines, and shows how these enduring patterns have since World War II increasingly been at odds 
with powerful economic and political trends in Europe. Indeed, it seems today that the priorities of 
governments so clearly manifest in aeronautics are now coming into direct conflict with other equally 
important economic and political goals of those same states. Thus, in aeronautics generally and civil 
aviation in particular, technological and commercial forces encouraging cooperation and even 
integration run headlong into concerns of states for their territorial and economic security. 
  This contradiction has become quite stark in the past few years, and the failure to resolve it 
continues to make painfully clear the fundamental internal inconsistency of state aims in this arena so 
crucial to the future of Europe. Yet is an inconsistency with which we will have to live for the 
foreseeable future, because states will continue to regard aeronautics in general and civil aviation in 
particular, as a sphere of activity directly affecting core interests. As long as questions of national 
sovereignty are involved, as they necessarily are regarding long-distance flight, states will continue to 
assert extensive prerogatives in determining who shall fly where and when, and by what means. 
 
States and the Global Aeronautics Industry.   The title of Anthony Sampson's insightful history of the world airline industry, Empires of the 
Sky1, is particularly apt because it captures in so few words the essential nature of the entire 
aeronautics sector. Often depicted as the achievement of individual heros such as the Wright Brothers, 
Bleriot, Earhardt, and Lindbergh, man's mastery of the air instead has been a triumph of governments. 
Indeed, the entire business of making and flying airplanes, most especially the key elements of its 
economics and technology, is a concrete manifestation of state priorities. Foremost among these 
priorities has been self-preservation; the most significant advances in powered flight have been made 
during wars both hot and cold. It necessity is the mother of invention, then modern aeronautics is the 
offspring of intense interstate rivairy and conflict. 
  At the same time, the scale and variety of the resources (both human and material) required in the 
production, operation and maintenance of the world's aircraft fleet makes it into one of the world's 
most important commercial undertakings. Directly and indirectly employing millions around the world 
through its connections to international trade and tourism, it is definitive of the term global industry. 
Moreover, the research, development and practical application of aeronautical technologies ranks 
among the most impressive and significant of all human accomplishments, and has led to discoveries 
and applications in diverse fields such as data processing, engineering, metallurgy and physics. 
Precisely because of its economics and technology, the air transport business has played the role of 
leading sector, stimulating a range of activities emblematic of modernity. 
  Paradoxically, the development of powered flight, pressed so far and fast by governments and 
nations engaged in pitiless struggle, has done more than any other innovation to link directly the 
peoples of the earth. It is this contradictory nature that lies at the heart of difficulties encountered by 
practitioners and analysts alike in their attempt to situate aeronautics in its proper analytical context, 
especially in relation to state and market.2 So important as a commercial and technological force 
integrating the world economy, it remains a primary concern of governments, and its structure and 
operation continue to reflect state priorities. Throughout its short history, aeronautics has occupied a 
crucial nexus connecting the economic and military dimensions of national security, and thereby 
combines the commercial and political in a unique fashion; it is the quintessential strategic industry.3 
 
Section I. The Development of the International Aviation Regime. 
Trends to 1945: Triumph of Sovereignty. 
  With the advent of powered flight at the turn of the century, European governments recognized the 
need to create a set of rules to regulate the possibility of regular air transit across international 
boundaries. With French engineers and pilots playing a leading role in the nascent field of aeronautics 
(the Wright Brothers notwithstanding), it was appropriate that the first international convention on air 
navigation convene in Paris in 1910.4 While the conference did accomplish important definitional and 
technical tasks, delegates differed sharply on the central issue at hand; sovereignty--the right of states 
to control the airspace above their territory. They adjourned agreeing to disagree on this key issue, 
showing "that aviation could never be divorced from its political implications."5 
  The experience of World War I and the dramatic, if marginal, role played by aircraft in the conflict 
served only to tighten the links between aeronautics and state security concerns. The document drafted 
at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 that would govern post-bellum international aviation was 
decisive, unequivocally stating in its opening article that each state was to have "complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."6 Against this background, the interwar 
period was characterized by intensive bargaining among national governments regarding air rights, 
with the results reflecting the primacy of economic and security concerns.7 
  World War II demonstrated not only the extreme importance of air power as an instrument of war, 
but also made the construction and operation of civil aircraft into a central security concern for the 
industrialized states. At the same time, the horrors inflicted by aerial bombing intensified pressures for 
the transfer of control over both military and civil aviation to an international body.8 Already before 
the end of hostilities the prospective victors were staking out positions regarding the principles that 
would shape the future configuration of civil air services, and parallel with numerous other end-of-war 
negotiations, decided to hammer out the issues in a formalized way. 
The Chicago Conference and the Bermuda Accords: Triumph of Bilateralism. 
  On 1 November 1944, the representatives of 54 states met in Chicago to decide the future of 
international aviation, and discussion revolved around the extent to which national sovereignty would 
remain its regulating principle.9 As was the case on many other issues regarding the character of post-war political economy, the erstwhile allies Roosevelt and Churchill held contrasting views.10 The 
British hoped to preserve imperial connections seen as even more vital to national economic and 
geopolitical security, while the Americans sought to open the colonial spaces to penetration by 
American corporations grown powerful since World War II had so decisively ended the Depression.11 
  Therefore, the American side pressed for bargains relating to air services to be struck among 
consenting states, while allowing the market to determine flight frequency and scheduling. Due to the 
dominant position of its firms in the production and operation of long-haul aircraft developed during 
the war, the U.S. government foresaw bilateral or multilateral agreements advantageous to its carriere 
under circumstances unrestricted by existing preferential arrangements or any prospective collective 
agreement.12 For their part, the British argued against this `open skies' approach, and "came out for a 
system of quotas to prevent the American airlines from flooding their routes ..."13 
   What emerged was a compromise between these positions; the multilateral accord would include 
the first two of four `freedoms' of air services proposed by the Canadian delegation: (1) the right fly 
over the territory of another country without landing, and (2) the right to land in other countries for 
maintenance, refueling or other technical reasons. The two remaining `freedoms' were to be the subject 
of separate negotiations, as was `fifth freedom' -- the right of a carrier to fly into a country and 
discharge or pick up traffic from third countries -- proposed by the U.S.14 These two primary rights, 
granted reciprocally and mutually by all signatories, were the basis for the International Air Services 
Transit Agreement, which remains in force today. 
  In addition, the Chicago Conference established the basis for the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), which in 1947 became a permanent specialized agency of the United Nations. 
Since its inception, the ICAO has been "a primarily technical body facilitating international 
collaboration in such matters as safety, navigation, and standardization ... "15, and has not concerned 
itself with economic or structural aspects of world aviation. Also, in the week following the Chicago 
Conference, executives of 34 of the world's major airlines met to create their own organization. First 
convened in Havana in April 1945, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) remains the 
main forum and mechanism through which airlines negotiate fares, scheduling and ticketing, albeit 
with perfunctory governmental approval. 
  Assessing its achievements, the wartime conference can be seen as either success or failure, 
however: "Given the circumstances of 1944, it is difficult to imagine how the Chicago Conference 
could have produced any other outcome than to secure air travel through a flexible system combining 
bilateral and multilateral features."16 While leaving the bulk of decisions concerning the configuration 
of world air services to the discretion of sovereign states through one-on-one negotiations, important 
legal and technical elements were made the subject of multinational determination. This hybrid 
framework, within which the conflict among state priorities was attentuated by collective arrangements 
guaranteeing basic rights of air transit to all participants, has proven sufficiently adaptable to survive 
right up to the present time. 
  It was within this framework that the two major protagonists in the effort to shape a postwar 
international air services regime, the United States and Great Britain, negotiated a bilateral accord that 
would serve as a model for other agreements. Concluded in 1946, the "Bermuda Agreement" was 
definitive in its "granting of reciprocal rights to the designated carriere of the contracting states to 
institute at their discretion capacity and fifth-freedom traffic arrangements."17 
  The practical effect of the accord was to allow the Americans significant inroads into the British 
market under the first three freedoms, with the British retaining the right to review the pattern of traffic 
as it developed, and to request ex post facto modification of the arrangements. The British also were 
able after signing the accord to purchase American aircraft to be used on crucial imperial and North 
Atlantic routes, thus preserving a British position in air services dangerously compromised by the lack 
of indigenously built, long-haul airliners. But beyond its specifics, the Bermuda Accord was significant 
in that bilateral bargains like it became the main mechanism through which states would shape the 
structure of international air services: "The dream of `open skies' gave way to the realities of horse-
trading between governments over landing rights, gateways and freedom."18 
 
Section II. The Postwar European Aviation Regime. 
  The Chicago Conference and the Bermuda Accord thus provided the political and legal context 
within which the post-World War II airline industry would develop both its global and regional 
characteristics. The establishment of a broad collective framework within which national sovereignty and bilateral negotiation would determine the actual pattern of air services proved especially important 
in western Europe. In this region, a large, urbanized and increasingly affluent population occupied a 
relatively compact but geographically and climactically diverse area; a situation apparently boding 
well for development of a robust airline industry. However, postwar cooperation in the military and 
economic spheres had done nothing to end nationalistic rivalries among the states: "the chief obstacle 
to cheap and efficient air travel was undoubtedly the political divisions of Europe."19 
  These divisions were manifest in the proliferation of airlines in Europe competing for intra-
continental business as well as a burgeoning overseas passenger and freight trade. National 
governments played major roles in the competition, as they took controlling or complete ownership 
stakes in carriers and directed their affairs through government ministries.20 States also financed the 
construction of rival airports to serve as hubs for air traffic, and oversaw the modernization of separate 
air traffic control systems. 
  The aggregated and cumulative effects of these nationalistic policies, based as they were on 
political priorities, were far from optimal economically speaking. By creating and maintaining separate 
and competing airlines in numbers much greater than would have existed if competition and consumer 
preferences had been allowed to dictate the pattern of air services in Europe, costs to consumers (in the 
form of higher ticket prices and less efficient services) and to the states themselves (in the form of 
direct financial subsidies and tax exemptions to the flag carriers) have been raised.21 However, 
attempts to remove political obstacles to the creation of a more rational economic structure in 
European air services have been consistently thwarted throughout the postwar era. This has been true 
even since the advent of the attempt to create a common market in Europe, and still today the issue of 
air services is among the most contentious on the western European economic and political agenda. 
 
Section III. The Development of the Common Market and the European Air Services Industry. 
  During the early 1950s, proposals to create a federated western Europe abounded, and the civil 
aviation sector was a frequent topic of discussion in this context. Numerous more-or-less concrete 
plans were circulated, but none were successful in garnering support from governments or airlines 
sufficient to warrant their consideration as viable solutions to the problems of the fragmentation of 
European air services along national lines.22 In hopes of reconciling these differences, a Conference 
on the Coordination of Air Transport in Europe was convened in Strasbourg in April 1954. While it did 
result in the establishment of permanent consultative body bringing the Transport Ministers of 19 (now 
23) nations in the region, the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) "has made only modest 
progress since its creation in 1954 toward joint development and coordination of technical procedures, 
facilitation and economic policy."23 The fundamental problem remained: "Each airline, backed by its 
own government, saw its objectives in national terms, based in its own hub airport, its own self-
contained crews, staff and maintenance."24  
  As the demand for air services grew rapidly in postwar Europe, each state reserved the right to 
carry traffic within national borders (cabotage) for airlines based in its own territory, requiring that 
foreign airlines unload and transfer passengers to a national ("flag") carrier as they continued their 
journey within each country. The rationale behind these restrictions was and remains a complex welter 
of economic, political and security motives, a mixture leavened by a generous portion of national 
pride.25 The result were predictable: "By tightly controlling market entry on both domestic and 
international routes, countries were able to provide their national carriers, in nearly all instances the 
sole designated operator, with virtual monopoly power."26 
  The signing of the treaty of Rome in 1957 creating the European Communities (now the European 
Union, or EU) is rightly seen as inaugurating a new chapter in the economic and political history of 
western Europe. But for all of its importance in so many sectors, the document had almost no impact 
on the structure of the European air services industry. While several of its provisions address 
conditions in the transport sector, in particular Article 3 which calls for a common transport policy, 
Article 84 specifically exempts sea and air transport from those provisions, leaving it to the Council of 
Ministers to determine precisely how those modes are to be regulated by the Community. And while 
Article 85 of the treaty prohibits the distortion of competition through market-sharing or price-fixing 
arrangements--precisely the situation prevailing in the web of bilateral agreements among the 
European airlines and governments--little political will to enforce these provisions was in evidence 
until very recently.27   Despite the effectiveness of national governments in assuring for their designated national carriers 
privileged positions in a tightly controlled market in international air services, consumers and would-
be competitors sought ways around high fares and limited services. As the 1960s and 1970s saw 
dramatic growth in European air travel a large and thriving non-scheduled charter business arose, with 
second-hand planes packed full of passengers flying at first to exotic destinations mostly in the 
Mediterranean and Caribbean. But as the operators and customers alike became more inventive at 
circumventing the regulatory distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled service, the charters 
also began to serve in essence as intra-European carriers on the fastest growing routes from northern 
Europe to the sunny coasts of France, Spain, Italy and Greece. Result: "scheduled operators were 
effectively priced out of these rapidly expanding markets as a result of their high operating costs."28 
  Another factor operating to the detriment of the web of preferential bilateral agreements governing 
European air services were changes in the pattern of competition in the world's largest market, the 
United States. Driven by rising fuel costs and increased competition from charter carriers, the major 
U.S. airlines took advantage of a liberalizing trend in U.S. regulatory policy generally and at the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) in particular to launch a wave of "fare wars" and other competitive measures 
within the U.S. air services industry.29 
  Part and parcel of these domestic reforms were efforts by U.S. airline management and 
government negotiators to liberalize the existing bilateral arrangements governing the lucrative 
transatlantic market. The need for such changes seemed particularly urgent from the American point of 
view in light of the agreement between the U.S. and Great Britain that went into effect in 1977. 
Dissatisfied with the pattern of air services that had developed between the two countries since 1946, 
the British demanded that a Bermuda II accord be negotiated. It imposed restrictions on existing 
nonstop services and limited the introduction of new routes: "As a result, Bermuda II sharply increased 
pressure within the U.S. for a more open international aviation regime."30 
  American tactics in subsequent negotiations revealed the extent to which economic self-interest 
lay behind the free-market rhetoric accompanying the zealous U.S. pitch to the Europeans for its `Open 
Skies' proposals: "The speed of liberalization was increased through the impact of a `beachhead' 
strategy adopted by the U.S. which was designed to penetrate one national market at a time and then 
force liberal agreements on others by virtue of the threat of traffic diversion."31 Simultaneously, in 
June of 1978 the U.S. initiated proceedings to review the legal status of the IATA's fare-setting 
practices in relation to U.S. antitrust legislation as applied to air services, which also entailed a veiled 
threat that the U.S. airlines might withdraw from the organization.32 
  These commercial and political pressures combined in the late-1970s to produce moves, initially 
tentative but gradually growing in force and effect, on the part of the EU to liberalize the air services 
regime in Europe. In 1979, the Commission issued its first ever Memorandum dealing with European 
air services policy, and in 1981 began to collect information on European airline's fares and costs to be 
used as the basis for future policy recommendations.33 
  Additional impetus for change came from the other institutions of the EU as well, with the Council 
of Ministers adopting a directive in 1983 making more difficult for states to refuse licenses for firms to 
operate inter-regional services.34 The membership of the European Parliament, both as a body and as 
individuals have attempted to exert reformist pressure, and the European Court of Justice has also 
played a formative role in shaping air services policy. In the celebrated 1985 "Nouvelles Frontiers" 
case, the effect of the Court's ruling in 1986 was to give the Commission and the Council much wider 
latitude in applying the 1957 Treaty provisions to air services.35 Still, under that ruling the impetus to 
undo the bilateral arrangements restricting the provision of European air services would have to come 
from the EU and its organs, or from the states themselves. 
  As a result of Nouvelles Frontiers, the Commission pressed forward with its agenda to promote 
greater air services liberalization, actually initiating proceedings against some airlines and halting these 
only when the Council of Ministers agreed to adopt directives on the matter. The result was the so-
called 1987 Package, which loosened governmental restrictions on fare-setting, and initiated a "phased 
policy of liberalizing market access over three years ..."36 In addition, the Council in 1989 agreed to 
phase out over three years governmental capacity-sharing arrangements altogether, and also to end 
within two years the criteria that an airline must be "substantially owned" by nationals before it could 
fly from a given country, effectively extending fifth freedom rights for foreign-owned airlines within 
the EC.37 The commission followed these measures with a third package of proposals in July 1991 recommending further loosening market access, and calling for an end to all controls on fares after 
1996.38 
 
Liberalization of European Air Services in a New World Order. 
  The halting steps taken toward the liberalization of air services within the EU in the mid-1980s 
and early 1990s encountered an economic and political environment dramatically changed by the end 
of the Cold War in Europe and the world. The euphoria associated with the parting of the iron curtain, 
and the economic opportunity these developments promised for west European industry (including its 
airlines) was displaced by the shock of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990. In a matter of 
days the world airline industry was thrown into chaos by the combination of sharply rising jet fuel 
prices, and a sharp fall in the demand for air travel because of fears of air terrorism, and deepening 
recession in the industrialized world. 
  The result was the most traumatic period in the world air services business since World War II, 
one that is only now slowly and fitfully coming to an end.39 European operators were by no means 
spared, and red ink flowed as yields fell; a sharp contrast to the rosy predictions of traffic growth made 
just months before, and on the basis of which the purchase of expensive new aircraft had been 
predicated. Like their counterparts elsewhere, airlines in Europe accumulated losses that, at least in 
nominal terms, exeeded all profits made since World War II. 
  The drastic deterioration of the financial condition of European airlines raised the stakes and thus 
sharpened the lines of conflict already in evidence regarding the reform of the air services regime in 
Europe. Many operators, especially Britsh Airways and the Dutch carrier KLM, called on the 
Commission and national governments to undertake a more rapid and comprehensive liberalization of 
services, so as to expand the market and thus profit potential for the most efficient carriers. These 
players and their respective national governments were especially anxious to see an end to the large 
and growing subsidies given by many European governments to keep financially afloat their prized 
flag carriers. They argued that such subsidies represented a distortion of market forces, an impediment 
to competition, and damaged economically viable operators. 
  Those arguing for a more open air services market and a phasing out of subsidies to national flag 
carriers were opposed by an uneasy alliance that included the management and labor forces of 
government-supported airlines, and their respective national governments now faced with huge subsidy 
payments straining budgets already in deficit. As airlines' financial troubles deepened in 1993, 
divisions within the alliance broke out into the open, quite dramatically on several occasions. Labor 
unrest sparked by forced retirements, pay cuts, massive job losses and other unpleasant elements of 
painful restructuring measures disrupted air services, and threatened to spark political crises.40 
  Backed by British Airways and the Conservative government in the U.K., during 1994 the 
European Commission became much more actively involved in both the market liberalization and 
subsidies aspects of the dispute. Its main target was the French government, which was pressed to open 
its internal routes to flights by outside airlines. The Commission also took a very dim view of the 
massive FF 20 billion bailout of Air France, and similar albeit smaller scale state rescues of national 
airlines were also closely scrutinized. While the Commission did eventually approve all requests for 
state aid to flag carriers, it did so with the admonition that this be done one time and for the last 
time.41 
 
Open Skies vs. State Priorities: Some Conclusions. 
  With the Commission apparently now squarely in the camp of those wishing to liberalize the 
provision of air services in Europe, it would seem that the days of the government supported flag 
carrier are numbered. Their privileged position is being eroded at two key points; the protection of the 
home market, and the financial lifeline from the state. Moreover, continued pressure from the EU for 
open national markets and an end to state aid appears to be working in conjunction with a recent trend 
toward the privatization of state-owned enterprises in Europe, including airlines.42 
  From the perspective of our analysis up to now, however, such a prediction would seem premature. 
While the financial strains of recent years have indeed brought to the fore serious problems with the 
national flag carriers of Europe, the fundamental issues at stake regarding their continued existence 
remain far from resolved. At the core of the debate resides the question of sovereignty: whether 
national governments have a right and indeed a responsibility to maintain effective control over civil 
air transport within their borders.   Throughout the history of aviation, that question had been answered unequivocally in the 
affirmative; and governments today when faced with the prospect of surrendering that prerogative have 
resisted staunchly. The web of bilateral agreements based on government-designated carriers having 
reciprocal access to national markets is the concrete manifestation of that prerogative, and thus will be 
very difficult to supplant.43 
  In Europe, the contradiction between the existing regime and the economic and political forces 
driving the continued integration of Europe has become quite glaring; clearly it is not rational to have 
the right to provide air services allocated among so many carriers. But since it is also clear that the 
forces of the market acting alone would quickly drive out all but a very few airlines in Europe, and that 
many of those might not be European-owned, states can be expected make every effort to retain 
important powers insuring that the vital air services sector and the benefits associated with it remain in 
national hands. 
  The interaction in the current economic and political context between the integrative and 
nationalistic forces at work undoubtedly will produce significant alterations in the air services sector in 
Europe. The questions to be answered, however, do not concern whether states will continue to exert 
powerful influence over the configuration of that industry, they will; but rather what forms this 
influence will take, and, more specifically, expect to see in coming years. While necessarily 
speculative, the available evidence suggests the following: 
 
* Governments will continue to demand and get the right to exert powerful influence over the 
allocation of air routes into and especially within their territory. The right of cabotage (the seventh 
freedom) will be reserved for nationally-based carriers, and concessions granted to outside carriers 
only under severe restrictions most likely entailing reciprocity. 
 
* The EU, especially the Commission, will continue to press for the removal of barriers to competition 
in air services within the EU. In exchange for grudging concessions of their authority in the areas of 
quantitative limitation of market access and fare rules, national governments will fall back upon a host 
of other domestic regulatory powers in an effort to maintain national preferences. Infrastructural and 
environmental constraints, especially regarding the construction of new airports and runways, and 
landing slot designations will become even more important areas of dispute, with the Commission 
facing an increasingly frustrating search for solid legal and political ground from which to press 
liberalization. 
 
* While negotiations in Europe concerning route allocation increasingly will be conducted 
multilaterally within the context of EU institutions and regulations; bilateralism will remain the 
primary mode through which agreements with extra-EU countries will be reached.44 Those 
negotiations and agreements will continue to reflect the relative market power of the participants, and 
increasingly include reference to considerations of transnational cooperation and ownership 
agreements among the airlines of the two countries concerned. 
 
* States will continue to hold significant and even controlling ownership stakes in airlines, and will 
restrict the identity and extent of outside ownership in those airlines if state-owned shares are sold, or 
as new carriers are created. Preference of ownership will be given first to nationals, then to nationals of 
other EU countries, and last to residents of outside countries. 
 
* Alliances among airlines will become more prevalent and significant, increasing in number and also 
in intensity; this latter term meaning that the connections between allied carriers will lead to the real 
integration of their organizations in all areas of air services, including ticketing, scheduling, routing, 
reservations, personnel training and management, and aircraft purchasing and maintenance. While EU 
preferences and concerns for regional unity might indicate the formation of such links among 
European carriers, issues of global market access may well dictate connections to carriers outside the 
region.45 
 
  These conclusions, qualified as they are, all assume a fundamental continuity in the character of 
air services well into the next century. As a key component of an economic sector whose very 
character has been shaped by governmental priorities, civil aviation cannot help but reflect the context within which it has evolved. That context is inherently political, and because of the transnational 
character of long-distance flight inextricably bound up with the question of national sovereignty. 
Commercial and financial forces undoubtedly will exert pressure for rationalization, but will not 
change the essential nature of the industry. 
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